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ABSTRACT 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the extent of social mobility in Latin America. Using 
educational attainment as a proxy for socioeconomic status in 18 Latin American countries, this study 
estimates ordinary-least-squared regressions of the persistence of educational attainment across 
generations. Furthermore, the role of ethnicity and gender is explored more in detail. Drawing on 
existing evidence, this thesis also elaborates on the potential determinants of social mobility and the 
implications for public policy.  Additionally, the transition into higher education is assessed, using a 
linear probability model. We find that the correlation coefficient between parents’ and children’s 
education is approximately 0.56 and that the estimated beta-coefficient from the regressions is 
approximately 0.41. Mobility is slightly lower among females and the non-white population 
respectively. Moreover, there is a high probability that an individual will enrol in higher education, 
given that the parents have undertaken tertiary education. Increasing the availability of quality 
education, as well as the social mix within schools and the access to grants/student loans, may improve 
social mobility. Finally, the implications for public policy are discussed with reference to an illustrative 
case study, on the Brazilian Conditional Cash Transfer programme Bolsa Família. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Latin America and the Caribbean is by international comparison the most unequal region in the 
world1. The 2010 Human Development Report from the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), emphasised that not only is the region unequal, but inequality is persistent 
and accompanied by low social mobility. Consequently, the Latin American region has fallen 
into an inequality trap that is difficult to break. Thus, the main objective of this study is to 
investigate the extent of social mobility in this region. While some factors that influence social 
mobility cannot easily be targeted by public policy, e.g. inherited abilities, other factors, notably 
the formation of human capital, are key areas for government action. Since education is an 
important component of human capital (Causa & Johansson 2009, OECD 2010) and an 
individual’s educational attainment itself is affected by family background (Behrman, Birdsall 
& Székely 1998), we use education as a proxy for socioeconomic status. 
 
Intergenerational mobility denotes how large a proportion of the parents’ socioeconomic status 
that is transmitted to the offspring. In other words, it captures the degree to which individuals 
have the possibility to attain a different socioeconomic status than that of their parents (Causa 
& Johansson 2009, OECD 2010). Previous studies have found that intergenerational mobility 
is low in the region (see Behrman et al. 1998, Andersen 2000, Behrman, Gaviria & Székely 
2001, Daude 2011, Daude & Robano 2015). Furthermore, the 2010 Human Development 
Report also emphasised how inequalities based on group characteristics e.g. ethnicity and 
gender, hinder human development in Latin America and the Caribbean. For example, poverty 
rates are higher among the non-white population, notably amidst the indigenous people and 
afro-descendants. Similarly, females have lower earnings than men, as they tend to be 
overrepresented in the informal sector of the economy. 
 
Against this background, this thesis aims to answer the following research questions: To which 
extent does the socioeconomic status of the parents affect the socioeconomic status of the 
offspring, using education as a proxy, in Latin America? Is social mobility lower for non-whites 
and females respectively? In addition, we look at the transition into higher education, as well 
as the potential determinants of social mobility and the public policies that may improve the 
situation. Using data from 2012 Latinobarómetro public opinion survey, we look at 18 different 
                                                          
1 Human Development Indices: A statistical update 2015, United Nations Development Programme. See figure 
10 in Appendix. 
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Latin American countries. The self-reported education of the respondent is regressed as our 
dependent variable, on that of their parents as our independent variable. In order to ensure 
reliability in our estimates, two measures of education are used: both the number of educational 
years and the level of education (e.g. primary, secondary and tertiary education). 
 
We find that the average correlation between parental and child education is approximately 0.56 
for the whole region and that the estimated beta-coefficient is approximately 0.41. El Salvador 
and Nicaragua stand out as the least mobile countries, while Colombia and Mexico display the 
highest levels of mobility in the region after Paraguay, which is an outlier. Mobility is slightly 
lower among females and the non-white population respectively. Moreover, there is a high 
probability that an individual will enrol in higher education, given that the parents have 
undertaken tertiary education. Equal access to quality education, increasing the social mix 
within schools and providing grants and student loans, are policies that may improve mobility, 
notably in education. 
 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses previous literature on 
intergenerational mobility. Section 3 outlines the theoretical framework elaborated by Becker 
& Tomes (1979; 1986) and Solon (2004). Section 4 provides the methodology and section 5 
presents the results from our regressions. Section 6 analyses the obtained results and their 
relationship to potential drivers of intergenerational mobility, together with a brief case study 
on the Brazilian conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme, Bolsa Família. Section 7 
concludes. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
When looking at income inequality in the world, the Latin American countries stand out as the 
most unequal (see Behrman et al. 1998, Andersen 2000, Behrman et al. 2001, UNDP 2010). 
According to Andersen (2000), high income inequality is not necessarily destructive per se, 
since combined with high levels of social mobility, it creates incentives for hard work and study. 
However, if high income inequalities are combined with low levels of social mobility, 
inequalities are more likely to persist. Corak (2013) discusses the link between income 
inequality and social mobility, by plotting “The Great Gatsby Curve”, presented in a speech by 
Alan Krueger2. It suggests that countries with higher income inequality, measured by the Gini 
index, also tend to be less mobile. However, when Andersen (2000) studied the Latin American 
countries specifically, no clear relationship between inequality and social mobility in education 
could be found. Thus, social mobility seems to be somewhat related to high income inequality, 
while other key factors may have an important influence. 
 
Figure 1 - The Great Gatsby Curve 
 
 
Within the literature on intergenerational mobility, socioeconomic characteristics such as 
earnings, occupation and education are common indicators. While studies for industrialised 
countries, notably Britain and the US, have been available for a few decades (see Atkinson 
                                                          
2 Alan Krueger was the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, in the United States. The full 
conference speech is available here: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/krueger_cap_speech_final_remarks.pdf  
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1980, Behrman & Taubman 1985, Peters 1992), our knowledge about intergenerational 
mobility in the developing world is far less extensive. As data on the pairs of parental earnings 
and the earnings of the offspring are less available for the developing world, using alternative 
measures to income enables further research within the area of social mobility3. In an attempt 
to cover the nature of intergenerational mobility in both the developed and developing world, 
Hertz Jayasundera, Piraino, Selcuk, Smith & Verashchagina (2007) estimate 50-year trends in 
the persistence of educational attainment of parents and children for 42 countries in different 
regions. In the findings by Hertz et al. (2007), the seven Latin American nations in their sample 
stand out as the least mobile, while the Nordic countries exhibit the highest levels of educational 
mobility.  
 
Studies concerned with the Latin American region specifically, all point to the same conclusion: 
that intergenerational mobility is low in the region, and further, it is identified as a key obstacle 
for overcoming persistence in social and economic inequality (see Behrman et al. 1998, 
Behrman et al. 2001, Andersen 2000). Behrman et al. (1998) estimate the empirical association 
between family background and education for children aged 10-21. Using micro data from 28 
household surveys in 16 Latin American countries, the authors conclude that increasing 
resources and educational quality have a positive effect on intergenerational schooling mobility. 
The authors further argue that countries with the same distributions of income may exhibit 
higher levels of welfare if there is higher social mobility. In addition, Behrman et al. (2001) 
explore the dimensions of intergenerational mobility in occupation and schooling for four large 
Latin American countries in comparison to the United States. The United States displays higher 
levels of intergenerational mobility than the Latin American countries and moving from the 
lowest classes in society is virtually impossible in the four Latin American countries, while it 
remains difficult, but not unattainable in the United States. Whether measuring occupational or 
educational status, the authors suggest that further research around the mechanisms determining 
social mobility – credit constraints, discrimination and spatial segregation – should be more 
closely investigated. 
 
Azevedo & Boullion (2009) review the existing evidence on social mobility in the Latin 
American region, both concerning earnings and educational attainment. In line with the 
arguments of Behrman et al. (2001), they suggest that the determinants of low social mobility 
                                                          
3 For example, Andrade, Veloso, Madalozzo, & Ferreira (2003) use occupation and education as instruments for 
earnings in Brazil. 
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in the region are associated with cultural and economic factors such as social exclusion, low 
access to higher education and discrimination. More recently, Daude (2011) and Daude & 
Robano (2015), estimated the effect of parental education on children’s education, controlling 
for circumstances beyond the individual’s control, such as gender, ethnicity and other socio-
economic factors. Using data from the 2008 Latinobarómetro survey, Daude (2011) finds that 
low social mobility is upheld by low downward mobility of those at the top, while children 
from the middle-income sectors face the risk of moving downwards. Furthermore, the most 
disadvantaged children had very little opportunity of moving beyond primary education. Being 
white did increase the average level of education, but had no effect on intergenerational 
mobility. These findings are consistent with the findings of Daude & Robano (2015), since they 
use the same round of Latinobarómetro survey data. Additionally, they find that females have 
lower educational attainment than men, but that there is no difference in social mobility between 
the sexes. Both studies suggest that key determinants of social mobility include access to credit, 
expenditure on primary education and the level of social inclusion. These findings are very 
much in line with evidence from the OECD countries (OECD 2010). 
 
Another mechanism through which inequalities persist, is the unequal distribution of 
educational opportunities. Following John Roemer’s (1998) work on equality of opportunity, a 
growing amount of literature explores the role of unequal opportunities in Latin America (see 
Bourginon, Ferreira & Menendez 2007, de Barros, Ferreira, Vega & Chanduvi 2009, Gamboa 
& Waltenberg 2012). Ferreira & Gignoux (2014) use a sample of 57 countries that participated 
in the 2006 PISA survey and estimate that inequality of opportunity explains around 35% of 
the differences in educational achievement. Furthermore, they conclude that the effect was even 
worse in the Latin American countries. Nevertheless, although unequal access to education 
itself may be an alarming issue, unequal access to the equivalent quality in education is another 
important aspect of schooling immobility. Daude (2011) also uses the 2006 PISA results and 
estimates the importance of educational quality in relation to social mobility. The author finds 
that the educational quality a child receives, is associated to the student’s socioeconomic 
background. The lack of social inclusion within private establishments was identified as an 
important determinant of student performance. 
 
Others have discussed the potential problems that lie within the interpretation of the 
intergenerational mobility estimates, such as unobserved transmitted abilities and 
characteristics (Sacerdote 2002, Plug 2004, Björklund, Jäntti & Solon 2007). Björklund et al. 
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(2007) investigate the concept of “nature versus nurture” more in depth, which refers to the 
distinction between inherited abilities from the parents and the abilities stemming from the 
environment in which the child is brought up. However, fairly recent evidence (OECD 2008, 
cited in Daude 2011) shows that the inherited abilities only have limited influence when it 
comes to intergenerational mobility. Furthermore, when studying cross-country variation in 
intergenerational mobility, the differences across countries are more related to environmental 
circumstances rather than inherited abilities. 
 
Against this background, this thesis contributes to the already existing literature by estimating 
social mobility with a more recent dataset and explores its relationship to potential determinants 
of intergenerational mobility. Moreover, a second contribution is to investigate the role played 
by ethnicity and gender on social mobility. Finally, a third contribution is to explore the 
transition from secondary to tertiary education more in detail. 
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This section presents the theoretical background drawing on influential work by Becker & 
Tomes (1979; 1986) and modifications by Solon (2004). According to Becker & Tomes (1979), 
the child’s income rises when parents invest in the child’s human or physical capital. The 
transmission of human capital between generations is therefore dependent on parents’ 
investment choice in the human capital of the offspring. 
 
3.1 A Simple Model 
Within the literature on intergenerational mobility, the standard strategy is to estimate a simple 
model between the earnings of parents and those of children. An individual is assumed to live 
for two periods: first as a child, and then as an adult. Each family consists of one parent and 
one child. The relationship is represented by: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑡     (1) 
 
where 𝑦  denotes earnings, 𝑡 the time period (thus 𝑦𝑡−1 designates the earnings of the previous 
generation, i.e. the parents), 𝑎 is a constant and 𝑏 captures the degree of inheritability of parental 
income. If the parameter 𝑏 grows over time, it implies that inequality also continues to grow. 
𝜀𝑡 is an error term, capturing characteristics that influence children’s earnings independently 
from parental earnings (Becker & Tomes 1986). The same model can be applied analogously 
to measures of education in order to estimate the persistence of parental background on future 
life conditions of their children. This is the type of model we estimate empirically for our 
sample.  
 
Becker & Tomes (1979) also pointed out that there is more than parental earnings that could 
influence children’s future earnings. In particular, aspects difficult to measure such as culture, 
ambition and networks also influence the child’s economic outcomes. Becker & Tomes (1979; 
1986) do not distinguish between inherited characteristics linked to biology (e.g. cognitive 
skills) and environmental influences (e.g. level of ambition). For more on this, see Björklud et 
al. (2007). Instead, all such characteristics are denoted as endowments, which can be passed on 
from one generation to another. By replacing 𝑦 with 𝐸, we get: 
𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡 + 𝑏𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑣𝑖,𝑡     (2) 
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where 𝐸 is the endowment, 𝑖 the family and 𝑡 the time period. 𝑎 is a constant and 𝑏 is the degree 
of inheritability of endowments. 𝑣 accounts for other influences on children’s endowments, 
such as luck. It is further assumed that parents cannot invest in their children’s endowments 
(Becker & Tomes 1986). Nevertheless, endowments play an important role in determining the 
future human capital of children, together with investments by parents and governments. The 
relationship can be represented as:  
ℎ𝑖,𝑡 =  Ψ(𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐸𝑖,𝑡)    (3) 
where ℎ is human capital, 𝐺 is government policy and 𝐼 is the parents’ investment in human 
capital. Ψ measures the degree to which these characteristics influence human capital. Thinking 
of human capital as education, equation (3) provides interesting insights. If assumed that parents 
can neither affect the endowments (𝐸𝑖,𝑡), nor public policy (𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1), the first step in determining 
how educational attainment is passed on from one generation to another, is to investigate how 
parents decide how much to invest in their children’s education. 
 
3.2 Parents’ Investment Choice 
Solon (2004) develops the Becker-Tomes model by rationalizing a log-linear income 
regression. In a first step, the children’s earnings will depend on their human capital and its 
returns, similar to the Mincer equation4. The level of human capital is, as represented by 
equation (3), dependent on government expenditure and investment, however endowments are 
now assumed to be exogenous. Parents can choose to invest either in their children’s human 
capital or to consume. According to Solon (2004), this choice will depend upon the parents’ 
preference for human capital over consumption (summarised in an altruism parameter) and the 
returns to human capital investment. Government policy can affect this choice by higher public 
investment or by changes in the tax rate. Solon’s (2004) model5 implies that while high-earning 
parents invest more in their children’s human capital, this effect could be offset by increasing 
the availability of funds, either by higher public investment or access to credit. Furthermore, 
the more altruistic the parents are, the more they will invest in their children’s human capital. 
Lastly, the higher the return on human capital investment, the higher is the propensity to invest. 
These aspects will be discussed in the light of our findings in section 6. 
                                                          
4 log 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜇 + 𝜌ℎ𝑖,𝑡 , where 𝜇 is a constant, 𝜌 denotes the returns to human capital and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 the level of human 
capital. 
5 For a mathematically detailed derivation of the model, see Solon 2004. 
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4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
This section presents the methodology and data of this thesis. Recalling our theoretical 
framework, earnings and human capital are closely related. Thus, by using education as an 
indicator of an individual’s human capital, we obtain a proxy for a person’s socioeconomic 
status. Consequently, we estimate intergenerational mobility as the persistence of parental 
educational attainment on the educational attainment of the offspring. There are several 
practical advantages with using education instead of earnings. First, while income data is scarce 
and volatile for the developing world, most household surveys nowadays include questions 
about the respondent’s education. Second, as education is easier to compute than earnings, the 
risk of measurement error is reduced (Daude & Robano 2015). Third, as an individual’s 
educational level is fixed after a certain age, while income varies over an individual’s lifetime 
(Haider & Solon 2006), it is easier to obtain estimates that are more likely to be stable in a long 
term perspective. 
 
Two main approaches are used to estimate the relationship between parents’ and children’s 
education. First, we estimate simple correlations between parental and child education, 
providing a rough indication of intergenerational mobility, however it does not control for 
unobserved characteristics that may influence the outcomes. Second, regressions are run with 
measures of educational attainment in the whole Latin American region, controlling for 
characteristics such as age, gender, ethnicity, marital status and urban/rural environment. We 
further examine this effect in more detail for each country in our sample. In order to ensure 
reliability and avoid bias, by only using the number of schooling years as an indicator of 
attainment, we also run the same regressions using educational levels (e.g. primary, secondary 
and tertiary schooling). In other words, we estimate our main model with two dependent and 
two independent variables: the parents’ education and the respondent’s education, both in terms 
of schooling years and the level of education. 
 
Moreover, in order to detect the transition from secondary to tertiary education, we regress a 
dummy variable for if the respondent has started university as the dependent variable, on a 
dummy variable for if the parents have started higher education as the independent variable. 
Using this linear probability model, we obtain the probability that the respondent has started 
university given that their parents have undertaken higher education. As in our main model, we 
run regressions using both the number of schooling years and the educational level as indicators. 
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Hence, we estimate this second model (i.e. the linear probability model) with two dependent 
and two independent variables, see tables 10 and 11 in Appendix for overall variable definitions. 
 
4.1 Data Sources and Description 
Data for the regression analysis is collected from the 2012 Latinobarómetro public opinion 
survey, providing country representative samples of around 1000 observations for each country. 
This gives us a total of 20 204 interviews obtained from 18 Latin American countries: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. The Latinobarómetro Corporation is a non-profit NGO that conducts surveys in the 
region every year and represents over 600 million inhabitants6. We chose to exclude all 
observations that were under the age of 18, in order to avoid individuals that are currently 
studying from biasing our sample7. The number of observations excluded were 125.  
 
When estimating intergenerational mobility based on educational years, we excluded those 
individuals who had responded “no answer” on their own and their parents’ education. The 
available alternatives to this question included: “without education”, “educational years ranging 
from 1-12 years of education”, “incomplete university”, “completed university”, “high 
school/academies/incomplete technical”, “high school/academies/complete technical”. The 
alternatives take a numeric value ranging from 1-17, where 1 stands for “without education” 
and 17 stands for “high school/academies/complete technical”. As the two last alternatives: 
“high school/academies/incomplete technical” and “high school/academies/complete 
technical”, are difficult to place on a scale of educational attainment, these were excluded from 
the sample. Consequently, the numeric value ranges from 1-15, where 15 denotes “completed 
university”. In total, 2 915 observations concerning parental education and 1 658 observations 
on the respondent’s education were excluded. A problem with the given alternatives, is that the 
answers “incomplete university” and the “complete university” are assigned the numeric values 
of 14 and 15, which do not necessarily correspond to 14 or 15 years of education. This is another 
motive behind investigating the movement from secondary to tertiary school in more detail. 
 
                                                          
6 See more at www.latinobarometro.org   
7 Naturally, some over the age of 18 could still be studying, however as the individuals have reached adulthood, 
it could also be assumed that they have completed the most fundamental parts of education. Furthermore, the 
transition into higher education is explored more closely in section 4.3.2. 
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In order to ensure further reliability in our estimates, additional regressions were run using the 
educational level as an alternative indicator of educational attainment. Available answer 
alternatives included: “illiterate”, “primary incomplete”, “primary complete”, “secondary, 
intermediate, vocational incomplete”, “secondary, intermediate, vocational complete”, “higher 
incomplete” and “higher complete”. The levels take a numeric value ranging from 1-7, where 
1 denotes “illiterate” and 7 “higher complete”. In total, 2 272 observations concerning parental 
education and 3 observations on the respondent’s education were excluded, as these provided 
“no answer” or “no data”. 
 
All in all, when estimating on the basis of educational years, 14 792-15 980 potential 
observations were left for the whole Latin American region. For educational levels, the sample 
became slightly larger with 16 633-17 931 potential observations. Estimates within each 
country were conducted with 483-1 127 observations based on educational years and 733-1 158 
observations based on educational levels. Descriptive statistics over the data, after the exclusion 
of observations outlined in this section, are found in section 4.1.1. 
 
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The current generation is on average more educated than their parents and this pattern is 
consistent when using the educational level attained as an alternative indicator. 
 
Figure 2 - Descriptive Figure by Country: Years of Education 
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This is the case in all countries, notably in Paraguay, which experiences the greatest jump in 
the average education of children compared to that of parents. Ecuador, Chile and Argentina all 
display high levels of education, both in terms of parents and the current generation. Venezuela 
seems to have experienced an increase in education from parents to children. Guatemala and 
Honduras show a low educational attainment both for respondents and parents. Table 1 displays 
descriptive statistics for all countries in our sample, using the number of years in education as 
our indicator. Table 2 also displays the descriptive statistics for all countries in our sample, but 
uses the educational level attained as the indicator (see table note). 
 
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics by Country (Years of Education) 
              
 Respondent Education     Parent Education    
Country Mean 25th Median 75th Std Dev. Sample  Mean 25th Median 75th Std Dev. Sample 
  pctl.  pctl.  Size   pctl.  pctl.  Size 
Argentina                      10.83 8 12 13 2.97 1 076  8.52 7 8 13 3.62 1 047 
Bolivia                  8.86 5 9 13 4.70 1 098  5.33 1 4 8 4.70 985 
Brazil               9.03 5 9 13 4.34 1 183  5.84 2 5 9 4.33 1170 
Chile 11.48 10 13 13 3.07 1 053  9.15 7 9 13 4.21 982 
Colombia  10.31 8 10 14 3.78 674  7.36 5 9 9 4.22 889 
Costa Rica  8.59 6 7 12 3.85 975  6.69 1 7 10 4.44 823 
Dominican Rep.  8.63 5 5 13 4.53 979  6.21 1 5 12 5.29 739 
Ecuador 11.49 9 13 14 3.32 1155  8.29 7 7 13 4.07 1087 
El Salvador  7.41 3 7 12 4.61 991  4.77 1 3 7 4.53 857 
Guatemala 5.37 1 5 7 4.24 970  3.97 1 1 7 3.94 909 
Honduras  6.53 3 7 7 4.12 993  4.72 1 4 7 4.05 897 
Mexico  8.81 7 10 12 3.97 1 113  5.36 1 4 7 4.34 1 082 
Nicaragua 6.71 2 7 10 4.35 991  4.24 1 1 7 4.29 865 
Panama  10.04 7 12 13 4.10 969  7.44 1 7 13 4.96 773 
Paraguay 9.91 7 10 13 3.33 1 142  5.11 3 6 7 2.65 1 060 
Peru  9.58 7 12 12 4.36 984  7.40 3 7 12 4.57 1 009 
Uruguay  9.59 7 10 13 3.19 1 107  7.73 7 7 10 3.39 1 033 
Venezuela 10.84 9 12 12 3.07 1 093  7.64 7 7 12 4.07 1 082 
              
Total 9.15 7 10 13 4.25 18 546  6.47   1 7 10 4.48  17 289 
              
Note: 1 = “without education”, 2-13 = “1-12 years of education”, 14 = “incomplete university” and 15 = 
“completed university”. 
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Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics by Country (Level of Education)  
              
 Respondent Education    Parent Education    
              
Country Mean 25th Median 75th  Std Dev. Sample  Mean 25th Median 75th Std Dev. Sample 
  pctl.  pctl.  Size   pctl.  pctl.  Size 
Argentina                      4.51 3 5 5 1.44 1 200  3.48 2 3 5 1.54 1 085 
Bolivia                  3.81 2 4 5 1.96 1 200  2.55 1 2 4  1.85 1 030 
Brazil               3.68 2 3 5  1.79 1 204  2.55 2 2 3 1.57 1 182 
Chile 4.59 4 5 5 1.49 1 197  3.62 2 4 5 1.69  1 014 
Colombia  4.35 3 5 5 1.52 1 200  3.15 2 3 4 1.69 1 089 
Costa Rica  3.70 2 3 5 1.67 1 000  3.05 1 3 4 1.78 833 
Dominican Rep.  3.43 2 2 5 1.79 1 000  2.70 1 2 4 1.98 755 
Ecuador 4.87 4 5 6 1.48 1 200  3.53 3 3 5 1.57 1 098 
El Salvador  2.83 2 2 4 1.69 1 000  2.08 1 2 2 1.53 858 
Guatemala 2.55 1 2 4 1.53 1 000  2.04 1 1 3 1.41 922 
Honduras  2.89 2 3 3 1.49 1 000  2.28 1 2 3 1.46 901 
Mexico  4.17 3 5 5 1.69 1 200  2.81 1 2 5  1.88  1 136 
Nicaragua 3.01 2 3 4 1.66 1 000  2.19 1 1 3 1.63 871 
Panama  4.19 3 4 5 1.65 1 000  3.30  1 3 5  1.90 786 
Paraguay 3.70 2 4 5 1.67 1 200  1.87  2 2 2 0.61 1 062 
Peru  4.59 3 5 6 1.88 1 200  3.57 2 3 5 1.98 1 098 
Uruguay  4.12 3 4 5 1.40 1 200  3.50 3 3 4 1.47 1 109 
Venezuela 4.85 4 5 6 1.45 1 200  3.44 3 3 5 1.66 1 103 
              
Total   3.92 2 4 5 1.77 20 201  2.90 1 3 4 1.74 17 932 
              
Note: 1 = “illiterate”, 2 = “primary incomplete”, 3 = “primary complete”, 4 = “secondary, intermediate, vocational 
incomplete”, 5 = “secondary, intermediate, vocational complete”, 6 = “higher incomplete” and 7 = “higher 
complete”. 
 
As seen in table 2, Guatemala’s educational level for the current generation displays the value 
2.55, which implies that the average respondent has only undertaken primary education, either 
complete or incomplete. By contrast, the average Ecuadorian has almost completed secondary 
education or the equivalent. When looking at the previous generation, Latin Americans have 
moved from primary education to secondary education (although not completed), and 
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experienced an average increase of 2.68 years8. These numbers are not considerably different 
from the statistics reported by Daude (2011), in which data from 2008 was used. 
 
4.2 Simple Correlations 
The first method used to estimate social mobility is through a simple correlation coefficient 
between parents’ and children’s education. A higher correlation coefficient implies higher 
immobility. However, the correlation coefficient is only intended to provide a rough indication 
of intergenerational mobility in the region, since estimating causal effects requires more 
precision and the correlation coefficient does not account for other factors that could influence 
the estimate. We estimate the correlation between parents’ education and children’s education 
both according to the number of educational years attained and their educational level. 
 
4.3 Econometric Model 
The second approach is to estimate the transmission of the parents’ socioeconomic status, 
proxied with educational attainment, on that of the offspring. The advantage with using this 
approach is that it allows us to control for aspects that may influence educational achievement. 
The baseline regression9 estimates the respondent’s educational attainment as dependent on 
parental educational attainment:  
 
𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑐 = 𝛿0 + 𝛽𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐     (1) 
 
where i denotes individual, c stands for country, 𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑐 indicates the respondent’s own 
educational attainment and 𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑐 the educational attainment of the parents. 𝛿0 is a constant and 
𝜀𝑖,𝑐 captures unobserved characteristics. A higher beta-coefficient indicates higher educational 
immobility between the generations, as the parents’ own education has more impact on the 
education of their child. One more year of parental education therefore results in 𝛽 more years 
of education for its offspring. 
 
 
                                                          
8 Calculated as the differences between the mean education of the respondent and the mean education of the 
parents, in table 1. 
9 𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑐 replaces 𝑦𝑡−1 in equation (1) in the theoretical framework, section 3. Since we use cross-sectional data 
and not time series data, the subscript 𝑡 − 1 is not used. However, it is still intended to denote the educational 
attainment of the previous generation. 
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4.3.1 Control Variables and Interaction Terms 
Controls for individual characteristics that may influence a person’s educational attainment 
were added. First we controlled for 𝑎𝑔𝑒, since education is assumed to increase with age. 
However, since the effect is most likely non-linear, an 𝑎𝑔𝑒2 term was also controlled for. As 
there are large differences in educational attainment between urban and rural areas in Latin 
America (UNDP 2010), we defined the dummy variable small city, which takes the value 1 if 
the respondent lives in a city with 20 000 inhabitants or less and 0 if it is more than 20 000 
inhabitants. In order to investigate if there are any differences due to gender, we defined the 
dummy variable female, which takes the value 1 if the respondent is a woman and 0 if the 
respondent is male. 
 
Based on the fact that poverty rates are higher among the non-white population (Ferreira, 
Messina, Rigolini, López-Calva, Lugo & Vakis 2013), ethnicity was controlled for when 
running the regressions. Hence, the dummy variable white was defined, taking the value 1 if 
the respondent is white and 0 if the respondent is from any other ethnic group (in our sample 
these are classified as: black, mulatto, mestizo and indigenous). A problem with this approach, 
is that the dummy variable only provides an indication of the differences in educational 
attainment between the white and non-white population, serving as an overall measure of racial 
discrimination. However, it does not document potential differences between different non-
white ethnic groups, e.g. if indigenous face more obstacles than mestizos. 
 
Furthermore, Daude (2011) found that married individuals exhibited higher levels of education, 
which is why marital status is also controlled for. Married is thus a dummy for marital status, 
given the value 1 if the respondent is married and 0 if the respondent is divorced or single. 
Finally, 𝜃𝑐 was included, as a control for country-fixed effects. This was done in order to 
account for differences attributed to country-specific characteristics, given disparities in 
average educational attainment across countries in our sample. The estimated regression, 
including controls, is as follows: 
 
𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑐 = 𝛿0 + 𝛽𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑐 +  𝛼1𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑐  + 𝛼2𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑐
2  + 𝛼3𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑐 +  𝛼4𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑐 +
𝛼5𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛼6𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑖,𝑐 +  𝛼7𝜃𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐    (2) 
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Additionally, according to Crenshaw (1989) it matters whether an individual is both female and 
from an ethnically marginalized group in the society. Thus as an additional control, we included 
the interaction term 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑐 × 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑐 accounting for the joint effect of ethnicity and gender. 
Moreover, in order to investigate how gender and ethnicity affect social mobility, the interaction 
terms  𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑐 × 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑐 and 𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑐 × 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑐 were included. The estimated regression, 
including interaction terms, is as follows: 
 
𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑐 = 𝛿0 + 𝛽𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑐 +  𝛼1𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖,𝑐 +  𝛼2𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑐
2  + 𝛼3𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑐 +  𝛼4𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑐 +
𝛼5𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛼6𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑖,𝑐 +  𝛼7𝜃𝑐 + 𝛼8𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑐 × 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑐 +  𝛼9 𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑐 × 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑐  +
 𝛼10𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑐 × 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐     (3) 
 
For the purpose of answering our main research questions, the coefficient of interest is 𝛽, which 
measures the degree of intergenerational mobility in education. A large coefficient indicates a 
high persistence of parental education on that of the offspring, whereas a small coefficient 
indicates high mobility. We expect 𝛽 to be positive and quite sizeable, given previous studies 
for Latin America (see Behrman et al. 2001, Daude 2011, Daude & Robano 2015). 
Additionally, we expect the coefficient on the interaction term between parental education and 
being white to be negative, as whites are likely to experience higher mobility. Furthermore, we 
expect the coefficient on the interaction term between parental education and gender to be 
positive, as females may experience lower mobility.  
 
4.3.2 Transition into Higher Education 
The last step is to create a separate regression to detect the movement from secondary to tertiary 
education. This is done as a robustness check, since higher education was assigned the number 
14 (for incomplete university) and 15 (for complete university) which is not entirely 
representative (as higher education usually last more than two years). The transition into higher 
education is also interesting to investigate, as the movement into tertiary education has mostly 
been explored for developed countries. This effect was estimated by a linear probability 
model10, using a dummy variable as the dependent variable and a dummy variable as the 
independent variable, while running an OLS-regression. The estimated regression is as follows: 
                                                          
10 Non-linear alternatives to the linear probability model include probit and logit regressions. In this case, the 
linear probability model was used as it eases the interpretation of the probabilities. 
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𝑅𝑈𝑖,𝑐 = 𝛿0 + 𝛽𝑃𝑈𝑖,𝑐 +  𝛼1𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖,𝑐 +  𝛼2𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑐
2  + 𝛼3𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑐 +  𝛼4𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑐 +
𝛼5𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛼6𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑖,𝑐 +  𝛼7𝜃𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐    (4) 
 
where 𝑅𝑈𝑖,𝑐 stands for “respondent university” and is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if 
the respondent has either incomplete or complete university education and 0 if the respondent 
did not attend university. 𝑃𝑈𝑖,𝑐 stands for “parent university” and is a dummy variable taking 
the value 1 if the parents have either incomplete or complete university education and 0 if the 
parents have no higher education. Two separate regressions were run, one using the number of 
schooling years and one using educational level attained. Interaction terms were not included 
as this would render the beta-coefficients for each country more difficult to interpret.  
 
4.4 The Validity of the Model 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the extent to which the socioeconomic status 
of the parents affects the socioeconomic status of the offspring. As socioeconomic status is 
proxied with education, it is important to interpret the estimates as an indication of the 
transmission of socioeconomic status across generations, i.e. not the pure effect of parental 
education on the individual’s education per se. There are most likely endogeneity problems 
present in the model, since the exogeneity assumption could be “broken” by, for example: 
omitted variable bias, measurement error and reversed causality.  
 
Omitted variable bias is not our main concern as the objective of this study is not to estimate 
the pure causal effect of parental education on the offspring’s education. If this would have 
been the purpose of our research question, it would have required us to control for other 
socioeconomic characteristics included in the error term, correlated with the explanatory 
variable: parental education. However, since we use education as a proxy for socioeconomic 
status, we intend our estimated beta-coefficient to capture the effect of characteristics such as 
earnings, occupation and even cultural traits. Aspects such as ambition and the interaction 
between family members, close friends and an individual’s network, also determine the 
educational attainment of children (UNDP 2010). Thus, by including too many control 
variables, part of the effect we wish to capture by using education as a proxy would be 
“controlled away”.  
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Measurement error, however, is of greater concern since we use a proxy variable, which 
naturally does not measure an individual’s socioeconomic status entirely. Nevertheless, as 
pointed out in the beginning of section 4, using education as a proxy is still more reliable than 
other options, such as earnings. Another concern is that some countries provided relatively 
small number of observations and that the samples risk to be not entirely representative of the 
whole population. For example, Paraguay shows the highest increase between the parents’ and 
the child’s average number of schooling years, without any clear explanation (see figure 2, in 
section 4.1.1). Such an increase is not consistent with previous findings by Daude (2011) and 
Daude & Robano (2015). Furthermore, as discussed by Ferreira & Gignoux (2014), there might 
be a problem concerning the fact that the different levels of educational attainment may not be 
comparable, due to disparities in the quality of schooling. For example, is one year of schooling 
in Brazil worth as much as one year of schooling in Sweden? Nevertheless, since samples from 
only one region are used, and despite a few differences in the educational quality and quantity 
among the Latin American countries, the region itself is quite homogeneous and therefore the 
problem might not be of great concern. 
 
Lastly, reversed causality arises when intending to estimate the effect of an independent 
variable on a dependent variable, but in fact, the coefficient also captures causality in the 
opposite direction, i.e. the effect that the dependent variable has on the independent variable. 
For example, when assessing the link between education on economic development, education 
is usually believed to have a positive effect on the gross domestic product (GDP) of a country. 
However, higher GDP is also likely to have a positive effect on education, as governments can 
spend more on schooling. Thus, the coefficient will overestimate the effect of education on 
GDP. Nevertheless, in our case, it is not likely that reversed causality is a problem, since the 
educational level of the children is implausible to affect the educational level of the parents 
(who have in most cases, already completed schooling). 
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5. MAIN RESULTS 
This section provides estimates of intergenerational mobility, using parental education as an 
independent variable to predict the educational attainment of their offspring. First we provide 
the reader with the results from some simple correlations between the respondent’s and the 
parents’ education. Second, we present our ordinary-least-squared baseline estimation and two 
supplementary estimations with additional controls. Third, the results for each country in the 
sample are shown. As a final robustness check, we regress a dummy variable for if the 
respondent has started university as our dependent variable, on a dummy variable for if the 
parents have attended university. This linear probability model enables us to detect the 
transition from secondary to tertiary education. 
 
5.1 Simple Correlations 
In order to gain a first overview of the persistence of parental education and that of children, a 
simple correlation was conducted for every country between the respondent’s and parents’ 
education, shown in figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 - Descriptive Graph by Country: Correlation Coefficient 
 
Note: Correlation coefficient obtained using years of education as the indicator. 
 
Chile shows the strongest relationship between the education of parents and children. Paraguay 
is an outlier with a correlation coefficient well below the regional average. Costa Rica and 
Guatemala display comparably lower correlation coefficients than the other countries. Overall, 
the average correlation coefficient for the whole region is around 0.56, which is above the global 
average of 0.43, estimated by Hertz et al. (2007). As a first approximation, the Latin American 
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region seems to exhibit a strong relationship between the educational attainment of the current 
and past generation. 
 
5.2 Empirical Results for Latin America 
Starting with the OLS estimates for the whole Latin American region, we first conducted the 
baseline estimation and thereafter added controls in order to detect which underlying factors 
that may influence the education of the current generation. 
 
5.2.1 Baseline Estimation 
Table 3 displays the results from the baseline regression. 
 
Table 3 - OLS Estimates - Baseline Regression Results    
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable: 
Respondent Education Years of Education Level of Education 
   
Parent education 0.53 *** [0.01] 0.54 *** [0.01] 
   
Constant 5.84 *** [0.05] 2.41 *** [0.02] 
   
Observations 15 980 17 931 
R-squared     0.31    0.29 
   
Note: *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%. Robust standard errors reported in 
brackets. 
 
As shown in table 3, the beta-coefficient for the variable measuring parents’ educational 
attainment, using educational years, is 0.53 and 0.54 when using the educational level attained. 
Both coefficients are significant at 1%. This indicates that irrespective of indicator, our results 
point in the same direction, namely that there is a high persistence in the educational 
transmission across generations. When using years of education as our measure, a beta-
coefficient of 0.53 demonstrates that if the respondent’s parents have one more year of 
education, the respondent will have 0.53 more years of education. Likewise, using the 
educational level attained as our indicator, a beta-coefficient of 0.54 demonstrates that one 
additional level of schooling, e.g. “primary complete” for the parents, will translate into 0.54 
additional levels of schooling for their offspring. In this case, the respondents may be on their 
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way to start secondary education. In line with the approximation from the simple correlations, 
the beta-coefficients suggest a strong relationship between parents’ education and that of their 
children. 
 
5.2.2 Additional Controls 
In a second step, regressions are run controlling for age, size of city, gender, ethnicity, marital 
status and country fixed effects. These controls serve to identify to what extent the parameter 
measuring parental education is driven by other factors. Furthermore, in order to detect 
differences in mobility attributed to ethnicity and gender, interaction terms, presented in section 
4.3.1, were added. 
 
In regressions (3) – (4) we included additional controls for age, place of residence, gender and 
ethnicity and country characteristics. As described in section 4.3.1, these variables control for 
other factors that may influence an individual’s educational attainment. Even though the 
coefficient of interest decreased from 0.53 to 0.40 (for years) and from 0.54 to 0.42 (for 
educational level attained) and thus showing a lower result than previous estimates from Daude 
(2011) and Daude & Robano (2015), it is still sizeable11. This provides a weak indication of an 
improvement in social mobility in recent years. We find that the variable for small city is highly 
significant and indicates a lower educational attainment compared to residents of a large city. 
Females and non-whites are less educated than the males and whites respectively. Moreover, 
given that there may be differences in education attributed to both gender and ethnicity 
combined, the interaction term 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑐 × 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑐 was added in regressions (5) - (6). Its 
coefficient was positive and only significant when using the educational level attained. The fact 
that there is a small increase in educational levels for white females could be driven by the 
relatively larger importance of ethnicity over gender in this region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Their studies showed a beta-coefficient that was around 0.6, including controls very similar to ours, using data 
from the 2008 Latinobarómetro survey. 
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Table 4 - OLS Estimates: Additional Controls                                  
 (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable: 
Respondent Education Years  Level  Years  Level 
     
Parent education 0.40 *** 0.42 *** 0.40 *** 0.41 *** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
Age 0.05 *** 0.04 *** 0.05 *** 0.04 *** 
 [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] 
Age squared -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 *** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Small city -0.65 *** -0.27 *** -0.65 *** -0.27 *** 
 [0.08] [0.03] [0.08] [0.03] 
Female -0.12 ** -0.03 -0.33 *** -0.16 *** 
 [0.05] [0.02] [0.11] [0.05] 
White 0.17 *** 0.06 ** 0.31 ** 0.03 
 [0.06] [0.03] [0.14] [0.05] 
Married -0.12 ** -0.07 *** -0.13 ** -0.07 *** 
 [0.06] [0.02] [0.06] [0.02] 
Female x White   0.02 0.11 ** 
   [0.11] [0.05] 
Parent education x White   -0.03 *** -0.12 
   [0.01] [0.01] 
Parent education x Female   0.02 ** 0.03 *** 
   [0.01] [0.01] 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 7.91 *** 1.77 *** 7.94 *** 1.82 *** 
 [0.25] [0.09] [0.03] [0.10] 
Observations 14 920 16 773 14 920 16 773 
R-squared 0.42 0.38 0.42 0.38 
     
Note: *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%. Robust standard errors reported in 
brackets. 
 
In order to detect differences across groups in terms of social mobility, we estimated regressions 
(5) - (6), including interaction terms between parental education and gender, as well as between 
parental education and ethnicity. We note that the interaction term between parental education 
and the dummy variable white is -0.03 and significant at the 1% level. This suggests that being 
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white decreases the beta coefficient with -0.03 years, given one additional year of parental 
education. The result implies that there is a slightly smaller persistence in the transmission of 
educational attainment of parents among their children, i.e. a higher degree of social mobility. 
Respectively, being female increases the beta-coefficient with 0.02, given one more year of 
parental education, which results in lower social mobility. These estimates are significant, 
regardless of educational indicator, with the exception of  𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑐 × 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑐. Here, the 
significance disappears when using educational levels attained, but the effect is larger and still 
points in the same direction. The above results imply that females face somewhat lower 
mobility than males and that mobility is slightly higher among the white population. However, 
the effects are small and should be interpreted with caution, as there may be important 
underlying cross country-variation. In the following sections, we explore these aspects further. 
 
5.3 By Country Regressions 
The estimated coefficient 0.4 in regression (2), implies a high persistence of educational 
attainment between the past and the current generation in Latin America. In order to identify 
which underlying country specific differences that could be related to social and economic 
patterns, we ran separate regressions for each country in our sample. The regressions were run 
controlling for gender, ethnicity, place of residence, age and age squared. Table 5 and Table 6 
display the results. 
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Table 5 - OLS Estimates: Additional Controls by Country (Years of Education) 
        
Dependent Variable: 
Respondent Education      
Country Name Parent Education Female White Small city Constant Obs. R-squared 
        
Argentina 0.41 *** [0.03]  0.34 **   [0.16]  0.19        [0.93]  0.29        [0.38] 7.20 ***   [0.59] 884 0.33 
Bolivia 0.47 *** [0.03]  -1.47 *** [0.24]  0.04        [1.09] -0.54 **   [0.27] 9.08 ***   [0.81] 835 0.47 
Brazil 0.41 *** [0.03]  0.30        [0.21]  0.95***  [0.21] - 0.59 *    [0.31] 7.29 ***   [0.73] 1 074 0.43 
Chile 0.38 *** [0.02] -0.24        [0.15] -0.01       [0.15] -0.38        [0.25] 7.28 ***   [0.60] 787 0.49 
Colombia 0.29 *** [0.03]  0.26        [0.27] -0.01       [0.29] -1.80 *** [0.32] 10.63 *** [1.16] 487 0.41 
Costa Rica 0.31 *** [0.03]  0.11        [0.26]  0.08        [0.27] -0.15        [0.57] 5.47 ***   [0.95] 760 0.13 
Dominican Rep. 0.37 *** [0.03]  0.20        [0.30] -1.00 **   [0.45] -0.75        [0.49] 6.73 ***   [1.00] 703 0.30 
Ecuador 0.37 *** [0.02] -0.43 *** [0.17] -0.08        [0.35] -2.26 *** [0.73] 6.60 ***   [0.65] 1 037 0.32 
El Salvador 0.52 *** [0.03] -0.64 **   [0.27]  0.79 *** [0.27] -0.85 *** [0.29] 6.70 ***   [0.97] 772 0.38 
Guatemala 0.34 *** [0.04] -0.66 **   [0.27]  0.15        [0.28]  0.04        [0.31] 6.62 ***   [0.91] 802 0.20 
Honduras 0.48 *** [0.03]  0.32        [0.24] -0.57 *     [0.34] -2.12 *** [0.31] 5.01 ***   [0.85] 809 0.35 
Mexico 0.30 *** [0.03] -0.60 *** [0.20] -0.78 **   [0.33] -0.95 *** [0.33] 9.48 ***   [0.74] 849 0.42 
Nicaragua 0.51 *** [0.51]  0.48 *     [0.26] -0.38        [0.46] -0.61 *     [0.36] 4.70 ***   [0.89] 776 0.33 
Panama 0.42 *** [0.03]  0.17        [0.27]  0.28        [0.31]  0.25        [0.30] 3.12 ***   [1.08] 705 0.27 
Paraguay 0.06 *     [0.04] -0.28        [0.19] -0.00        [0.20] -0.85 *** [0.20] 12.39 *** [0.71] 961 0.18 
Peru 0.46 *** [0.03] -1.10 *** [0.25] -0.14        [0.41] -0.30        [0.35] 5.87 ***   [0.88] 771 0.35 
Uruguay 0.49 *** [0.03]  0.21        [0.16]  0.50 *** [0.19] -0.33 *     [0.17] 4.83 ***   [0.72] 926 0.38 
Venezuela 0.32 *** [0.03]  0.43 *** [0.17]  0.43 **   [0.17]  0.31        [0.36] 5.59 ***   [0.68] 982 0.30 
        
Note: Table only showing the main results from the by country regression, not showing the additional control 
variables included in the regressions: age, age squared and married. *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 
5%, * = significant at 10%. Robust standard errors reported in brackets. 
 
Figure 4 - Descriptive Graph by Country: Beta-Coefficient on Parents’ Education (Educational Years 
Attained) 
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Table 6 - OLS Estimates: Additional Controls by Country (Level of Education) 
        
Dependent Variable: 
Respondent Education      
Country Name Parent Education Female White Small city Constant Obs. R-squared 
        
Argentina 0.44 *** [0.03]  0.18 **   [0.08]  0.05        [0.09] -0.00        [0.19] 2.35 *** [0.27] 1 026 0.28 
Bolivia 0.50 *** [0.03] -0.46 *** [0.10]  0.02        [0.33] -0.22 *     [0.12] 2.87 *** [0.34] 953 0.39 
Brazil 0.45 *** [0.03]  0.20 **   [0.09]  0.46***  [0.09] -0.34 *** [0.13] 2.59 *** [0.33] 1 100 0.35 
Chile 0.44 *** [0.03] -0.07        [0.07] -0.02        [0.07] -0.09        [0.12] 2.58 *** [0.29] 933 0.40 
Colombia 0.38 *** [0.03] -0.04        [0.08] -0.09        [0.09] -0.52 *** [0.09] 2.81 *** [0.29] 1 019 0.40 
Costa Rica 0.34 *** [0.03]  0.04        [0.12] -0.01        [0.12] -0.02        [0.26] 2.06 *** [0.41] 791 0.13 
Dominican Rep. 0.42 *** [0.03] -0.02        [0.11] -0.40 *** [0.16] -0.28        [0.19] 2.19 *** [0.37] 737 0.30 
Ecuador 0.42 *** [0.03] -0.21 *** [0.07] -0.15        [0.15] -1.32 *** [0.19] 2.36 *** [0.30] 1 086 0.29 
El Salvador 0.54 *** [0.04] -0.18 *     [0.10]  0.24 **   [0.11] -0.26 **   [0.11] 2.38 *** [0.39] 781 0.32 
Guatemala 0.40 *** [0.05] -0.25 **   [0.10] -0.05        [0.10]  0.01        [0.11] 2.28 *** [0.33] 836 0.21 
Honduras 0.50 *** [0.04]  0.11        [0.09] -0.15        [0.13] -0.71 *** [0.11] 1.87 *** [0.32] 819 0.34 
Mexico 0.31 *** [0.02] -0.22 **   [0.09] -0.41 *** [0.14] -0.47 *** [0.14] 3.75***  [0.31] 960 0.37 
Nicaragua 0.52 *** [0.04]  0.20 **   [0.10] -0.09        [0.17] -0.23 *     [0.13] 1.79 *** [0.35] 789 0.33 
Panama 0.43 *** [0.03]  0.11        [0.11]  0.09        [0.13]  0.11        [0.12] 0.92 *** [0.44] 742 0.25 
Paraguay -0.08       [0.08] -0.15        [0.10] -0.12        [0.10] -0.52 *** [0.10] 5.08 *** [0.37] 1 017 0.13 
Peru 0.45 *** [0.03] -0.37 *** [0.10]  0.07         [0.15] -0.04        [0.14] 1.91 *** [0.33] 1 016 0.31 
Uruguay 0.43 *** [0.03]  0.19 *** [0.07]  0.37 ***  [0.08] -0.18 **   [0.08] 2.13 *** [0.29] 1 078 0.27 
Venezuela 0.36 *** [0.03]  0.17 **   [0.07]  0.22 ***  [0.07]  0.02        [0.16] 1.83 *** [0.29] 1 090 0.28 
        
Note: Table only showing the main results from the by country regression, not showing the additional control 
variables: age, age squared and married. *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%. 
Robust standard errors reported in brackets. 
 
As seen figure 4 and in table 5, El Salvador has the highest beta-coefficient in the region, with 
a value of 0.52, significant at 1%. When looking at educational levels attained as our indicator 
instead (table 6), the beta-coefficient is now 0.54 and still significant at 1%. Irrespective of 
indicator, the coefficient of interest indicates a high persistence in the transmission of 
educational attainment of parents among their children. Other countries with a beta-coefficient 
around 0.5 include Honduras, Nicaragua and Uruguay, implying lower levels of mobility than 
we observed in regressions (3) – (6), for the Latin American region. Countries with higher 
mobility than Latin America as a whole, include Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Venezuela, 
with coefficients around 0.3. Paraguay is an outlier, with the lowest beta-coefficient, 0.06, in 
the region. As mentioned in section 4.4, the sub-sample for Paraguay may be unrepresentative 
of the whole population. Furthermore, the beta-coefficient for Paraguay is no longer significant 
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when using educational level attained instead of educational years as the indicator. Comparing 
our results with those of Daude & Robano (2015), Paraguay ranks in the middle in terms of 
mobility, with a beta-coefficient of 0.55. We find it unlikely that Paraguay has changed so 
drastically from 2008 to 2012. 
 
The regressions including interaction terms are presented in table 7 and table 8. 
Table 7 - OLS Estimates: Interaction Terms (Years of Education)   
 
Dependent Variable: 
Respondent Education      
Country  Parent Education Parent × White  Parent × Female Obs. R-squared 
 
Argentina 0.49 *** [0.05] -0.11 **   [0.05] -0.01       [0.05] 884 0.33 
Bolivia  0.39 *** [0.04]  0.23        [0.20]  0.14*** [0.04] 835 0.50 
Brazil 0.41***  [0.04] -0.02        [0.04]  0.02       [0.04] 1 074 0.44 
Chile 0.34 *** [0.04]  0.02        [0.04]  0.05       [0.04] 787 0.49 
Colombia 0.32 *** [0.04] -0.00        [0.06] -0.03       [0.05] 487 0.41 
Costa Rica 0.34 *** [0.05] -0.00        [0.06] -0.07       [0.06] 760 0.14 
Dominican Rep. 0.37 *** [0.04]  0.13        [0.09] -0.02       [0.05] 703 0.30 
Ecuador 0.36 *** [0.03]  0.04        [0.08]  0.02        [0.04] 1 037 0.32 
El Salvador 0.53 *** [0.05] -0.04        [0.06]  0.03        [0.05] 772 0.39 
Guatemala 0.34 *** [0.06] -0.14 *     [0.08]  0.11        [0.08] 802 0.21 
Honduras 0.46 *** [0.05]  0.16 **   [0.08]  0.00        [0.06] 809 0.35 
Mexico 0.29 *** [0.03]  0.02        [0.07]  0.01        [0.05] 849 0.42 
Nicaragua 0.50 *** [0.05]  0.09        [0.09] -0.01        [0.06] 776 0.33 
Panama 0.46 *** [0.04] -0.21 *** [0.07] -0.03        [0.06] 705 0.28 
Paraguay 0.04        [0.06] -0.11        [0.07]  0.11        [0.07] 961 0.18 
Peru 0.40 *** [0.04] -0.06        [0.08]  0.14 *** [0.05] 771 0.36 
Uruguay 0.45 *** [0.05]  0.06        [0.05] -0.02 **   [0.05] 926 0.38 
Venezuela 0.38 *** [0.03] -0.05        [0.05] -0.08 *     [0.04] 982 0.30 
      
Note: Table only showing the main results from the by country regressions including the interaction terms, not 
showing the additional control variables: age, age squared, small city, female, white and married. *** = significant 
at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%. Robust standard errors reported in brackets. 
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Table 8 - OLS Estimates: Interaction Terms (Level of Education)   
 
Dependent Variable: 
Respondent Education      
Country  Parent Education Parent × White  Parent × Female Obs. R-squared 
      
Argentina  0.49 *** [0.06] -0.05        [0.06]  0.00        [0.06] 1 026 0.28 
Bolivia   0.42 *** [0.04]  0.16        [0.13]  0.15 *** [0.05] 953 0.39 
Brazil  0.43 *** [0.05]  0.00        [0.05]  0.04        [0.05] 1 100 0.35 
Chile  0.35 *** [0.05]  0.12 **   [0.05]  0.02        [0.05] 933 0.40 
Colombia  0.36 *** [0.04] -0.03        [0.05]  0.06        [0.04] 1 019 0.37 
Costa Rica  0.36 *** [0.06] -0.00        [0.03] -0.05        [0.07] 781 0.12 
Dominican Rep.  0.40 *** [0.05]  0.07        [0.08]  0.00        [0.06] 737 0.30 
Ecuador  0.42 *** [0.03]  0.22 *** [0.07] -0.01        [0.05] 1 086 0.29 
El Salvador  0.55 *** [0.07]  0.01        [0.08] -0.04        [0.07] 781 0.32 
Guatemala  0.44 *** [0.07] -0.16 *     [0.09]  0.07        [0.09] 836 0.22 
Honduras  0.46 *** [0.05]  0.21 **   [0.08]  0.02        [0.07] 819 0.35 
Mexico  0.28 *** [0.03] -0.02        [0.07]  0.08 *     [0.04] 960 0.37 
Nicaragua  0.51 *** [0.05]  0.03        [0.10]  0.2          [0.07] 789 0.33 
Panama  0.46 *** [0.04] -0.17 **   [0.07]  0.01        [0.06] 742 0.26 
Paraguay -0.34 **   [0.13]  0.24        [0.16]  0.28 *     [0.15] 1 017 0.13 
Peru  0.40 *** [0.03] -0.12        [0.07]  0.14 *** [0.05] 1 016 0.32 
Uruguay  0.30 *** [0.06]  0.13 **   [0.06]  0.03        [0.05] 1 078 0.27 
Venezuela  0.43 *** [0.03] -0.06        [0.05] -0.09 *     [0.05] 1 090 0.29 
      
Note: Table only showing the main results from the by country regressions including the interaction terms, not 
showing the additional control variables: age, age squared, small city, female, white and married. *** = significant 
at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%. Robust standard errors reported in brackets. 
 
A majority of the interaction term coefficients were very small or insignificant. Nevertheless, a 
few countries stand out. In Peru, the interaction between parental education and female was 
significant at the 1% level, with a coefficient of 0.14. This suggests that females face lower 
social mobility than men in Peru. The opposite case was present in Venezuela, where females 
face a slightly higher social mobility, with the coefficients -0.08 (educational years) and -0.09 
(educational levels), significant at 10%. The interaction term between parental education and 
the white dummy variable was significant in Panama (at 1%), Honduras (at 5%) and Guatemala 
(at 10%). In Panama and Guatemala, the coefficients were negative, indicating higher social 
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mobility for the white population, while they were positive in Honduras, indicating the opposite. 
The coefficients ranged between ±0.14-0.22 irrespective of which indicator was used. 
 
5.4 Linear Probability Model Estimates 
In order to detect the transition into higher education, we estimated a linear probability model, 
described in section 4.3.2. The results from the regressions are displayed in table 9. 
 
Table 9 - OLS Estimates: Dummy Variable as Dependent and Independent 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Respondent University      
Country Name Parent University Obs. R- squared  Parent University Obs. R- squared 
 (Years of Education)    (Level of Education)   
        
Argentina 0.49 *** [0.07] 884 0.12  0.39 *** [0.05] 1 026 0.10 
Bolivia 0.52 *** [0.07] 835 0.15  0.50 *** [0.05] 953 0.17 
Brazil 0.48 *** [0.08] 1 074 0.13  0.48 *** [0.07] 1 100 0.13 
Chile 0.55 *** [0.06] 787 0.20  0.51 *** [0.05] 933 0.18 
Colombia 0.64 *** [0.05] 487 0.38  0.55 *** [0.05] 1 019 0.19 
Costa Rica 0.47 *** [0.06] 760 0.13  0.42 *** [0.06] 791 0.11 
Dominican Rep. 0.46 *** [0.06] 703 0.18  0.42 *** [0.06] 737 0.15 
Ecuador 0.41 *** [0.05] 1 037 0.09  0.42 *** [0.04] 1 086 0.10 
El Salvador 0.50 *** [0.08] 772 0.16  0.47 *** [0.08] 781 0.15 
Guatemala 0.44 *** [0.10] 802 0.12  0.40 *** [0.10] 836 0.10 
Honduras 0.31 *** [0.09] 809 0.07  0.31 *** [0.09] 819 0.07 
Mexico 0.41 *** [0.07] 849 0.15  0.33 *** [0.05] 960 0.11 
Nicaragua 0.38 *** [0.09] 776 0.10  0.34 *** [0.08] 789 0.09 
Panama 0.44 *** [0.05] 705 0.12  0.42 *** [0.05] 742 0.12 
Paraguay 0.42        [0.33]  961 0.06  0.39        [0.24] 1 017 0.06 
Peru 0.52 *** [0.06] 771 0.18  0.40 *** [0.04] 1 016 0.13 
Uruguay 0.49 *** [0.07] 926 0.16  0.27 *** [0.05] 1 078 0.08 
Venezuela 0.47 *** [0.07] 982 0.11  0.37 *** [0.06] 1 090 0.09 
        
Note: Table only showing the main results from the by country regressions, not showing the additional control 
variables: age, age squared, small city, female, white and married. *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, 
* = significant at 10%. Robust standard errors reported in brackets. 
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All countries except for one, Paraguay is insignificant, display a beta-coefficient significant at 
1%. The results show the probability that the respondent will start university, given that the 
parents have started university. For example, in the case of Argentina which has a beta-
coefficient of 0.49 (for years of education), it should be interpreted in the following way: in 
comparison to the individuals whose parents have not attended university, the individuals with 
parents having a university education, have a 49 percentage points larger probability that they 
themselves will attend university. Interesting to note is that even though Colombia was one of 
the most mobile countries in our sample, it displays the highest probability that the respondent 
will start university, given that the parents have started university. This may suggest that 
mobility is lower at the higher levels of education in Colombia. 
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6. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This section discusses the potential drivers of intergenerational mobility and the policy 
implications in the light of our findings. Rather than presenting causal relationships between 
factors affecting mobility and our estimates, they are analysed against conclusions from 
previous research, e.g. by plotting our beta-coefficient against country-level statistics. 
Furthermore, an illustrative case study on the Brazilian CCT programme Bolsa Família is 
provided, as similar programmes have become an important part of social policy all over Latin 
America, aiming to build human capital and create equal opportunities. 
 
6.1 Inequality and Social Mobility 
As seen in figure 5, all countries in Latin America are highly unequal, since even the least 
unequal countries in the region have a high Gini coefficient of around 0.40. A Gini coefficient 
of 1 represents perfect inequality and a Gini coefficient of 0 means perfect equality. To place 
the Gini coefficients of the Latin American countries in a context, egalitarian countries such as 
Sweden had a coefficient of approximately 0.26 in the time period 2005-201312. Furthermore, 
our estimated beta-coefficients suggest that although the region is more mobile now than when 
using data from 2008 (see Daude 2011, Daude & Robano 2015), social mobility is still low in 
international comparison. Consequently, plotting our estimates against the Gini index (see 
figure 6) may not provide any clear indication of a relationship between inequality and mobility.  
 
Figure 5 - Bar Chart: Gini Coefficient for each Country in the Region 
 
Source: World Bank Indicators, latest available data.13 
                                                          
12 Available from: http://data.un.org/DocumentData.aspx?q=inequality+adjusted+hdi&id=379 
13 Year 2012 for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay. Year 2011 for Chile and Guatemala, 2009 for Nicaragua 
and 2006 for Venezuela. 
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Figure 6 - Scatter plot of the Gini Index and the Estimated Beta-Coefficient on Parents’ Education 
 
Source: World Bank Indicators and the authors’ own calculations 
 
As seen in figure 6, there was no conclusive pattern between inequality and mobility, 
confirming our above reasoning. This is also in line with results from Andersen (2000), where 
using data only for the Latin American region did not provide a clear indication of the link 
between income inequality and mobility. Honduras exhibits both high immobility as well as 
high inequality and Paraguay is clearly an outlier, with a Gini coefficient on par with the 
regional average, while the estimated mobility is unusually high. However, excluding Honduras 
and Paraguay from the interpretation of the figure, there may be a counter-intuitive pattern, 
suggesting that a higher beta-coefficient is associated with less income inequality. A 
speculation on the potential reasons for this, could be that social policies in unequal countries 
have started to increase mobility, while the effected has not yet translated into less inequality. 
El Salvador is also an interesting case, as it was estimated as the most immobile country in our 
sample, while its Gini coefficient is among the lower ones in the region. Argentina and Uruguay 
are also more immobile than expected given their income distribution. By contrast, Colombia 
is one of the most unequal countries in our sample, whereas its estimated mobility was high in 
regional comparison. Using data from industrialised countries, however, evidence suggests that 
immobility and inequality are somewhat associated (see Andrews & Leigh 2009, Corak 2013).  
 
As discussed in section 2, the distribution and accessibility of education may also influence 
social mobility. Plotting inequality in education against our estimates, figure 7 shows that there 
is a weak positive relationship between the distribution of education and intergenerational 
mobility. 
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Figure 7 - Scatter plot over Inequality in Education14 and the Estimated Beta-Coefficient on Parents’ 
Education 
 
Source: Human Development Indices: A statistical update 2015, United Nations Development Programme and the 
authors’ own calculations 
 
As figure 7 displays, Paraguay, Guatemala, Argentina and Uruguay are outliers. However, it is 
interesting to note that the two most immobile countries, El Salvador and Nicaragua, also 
exhibit high levels of inequality in education. By contrast, Colombia and Mexico, have a much 
lower level of inequality in education. Thus, while income inequality itself may not have the 
most important impact on social mobility in the region, an unequal distribution of education 
seems more associated to the persistence of economic outcomes across generations. Against 
this background, an area of priority for public policy in Latin America, should arguably be to 
equalise educational opportunity across groups in society. 
 
6.1.1 Inequality between Groups 
Inequalities between groups, e.g. racial and gendered inequalities, may also influence 
intergenerational mobility. In particular, an unequal distribution of education might create 
obstacles for marginalised groups to climb up the socioeconomic ladder. In our sample, 
Venezuela and Uruguay stand out as the only countries with a statistically significant positive 
                                                          
14 Measured as the inequality in years of schooling, based on data from household surveys, estimated by the 
Atkinson inequality index. Data available from: 
http://data.un.org/DocumentData.aspx?q=inequality+adjusted+hdi&id=379 
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effect (at 10% and 5% respectively)15 of being female on social mobility16, even though the 
effects were very weak. Findings by Andersen (2000) for teenage girls, point in the same 
direction, as girls showed to be more mobile in Venezuela. On the other hand, being female in 
Bolivia and Peru displayed the largest negative effect on both educational attainment and social 
mobility. According to Ferreira et al. (2013), ethnic minority households also tend to be at the 
bottom of the income distribution and therefore may face more unequal opportunities. 
Furthermore, they find that children from ethnic minorities in three Latin American countries: 
Brazil, Ecuador and Guatemala, perform worse in school. This may imply that it is more 
difficult for non-white children to move on from one educational level to another. Therefore, in 
terms of ethnicity, it may not be surprising that non-whites generally experience greater 
persistence of parental background on their economic outcomes. As displayed in our results, 
non-whites experienced lower social mobility than whites, as well as a lower educational 
attainment.  
 
Overall, our results in section 5 imply that there is a slightly smaller persistence in the 
transmission of educational attainment for the white population, while the opposite holds for 
females. These conclusions are not the same as those drawn by Daude & Robano (2015), using 
similar data for 2008. Their estimates were only significant at 10% for the interaction term 
parental education and white, and insignificant for parental education and female. By contrast, 
our interaction terms are statistically significant at 1% and 5% respectively17. This may imply 
that the situation for non-whites and females have slightly worsened over the last four years 
(2008-2012), nevertheless the estimates are so small that they may not be economically 
significant. Consequently, the only conclusion to be drawn from our estimates is that the 
situation has not improved, despite the Millennium Development Goal to eliminate gender 
inequality18. This insight might build on the fact that educational attainment is unequally 
distributed between groups.  
 
6.2 Educational Polices 
Educational policies have a great possibility to influence intergenerational mobility and 
equalising opportunity for disadvantaged groups in society. Daude & Robano (2015) show a 
                                                          
15 Estimated as years of schooling, see table 7. 
16 With regards to the interaction term:  𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑐 × 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑐  
17 For educational years. 
18 See more at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/gender.shtml 
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negative relationship between public expenditure on education per student, relative to GDP per 
capita and intergenerational mobility. Andersen (2000) points out that a free education system 
would enable students to choose their education irrespective of family background. Thus, as a 
first intuition, government policy could affect mobility by spending more to make education 
accessible for all. 
 
Figure 8 - Scatter plot of Government Expenditure on Education and the Estimated Beta-Coefficient 
on Parents’ Education 
 
Source: World Bank Indicators and the authors’ own calculations 
Note: Data for Costa Rica is missing. Data reflects the latest available year19. 
 
Figure 8 displays the relationship between government expenditure on education and our 
estimated beta-coefficient. While there is no clear pattern, we note that many countries stay 
immobile despite high levels of spending on education, e.g. Venezuela, Bolivia and Honduras. 
Daude (2011) points out that most countries in Latin America, with the exception of Costa Rica 
and El Salvador, are inefficient in generating mobility through educational spending. Thus, the 
explanation may lie in where educational spending is targeted. Is it targeted towards basic or 
tertiary education? Is it directed towards raising the quality or the quantity of education? These 
questions are the main focus of the following sub-sections. 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Year 2012 for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru. 2013 for 
Honduras, 2011 for El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay. 2010 for Nicaragua, 2009 for Venezuela, 2007 for 
Dominican Republic. 
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6.2.1 Spending on Basic Education 
Recalling the previous discussion about equalising opportunity, research has pointed to the 
importance of early childhood education as a tool for bridging gaps between disadvantaged and 
privileged groups in the developing world, notably in Latin America and the Caribbean (Vegas 
& Santibáñez 2010). Furthermore, public expenditure on basic education is shown to have a 
positive impact on educational mobility. Higher enrolment rates in early childhood education 
lowers the influence of parental background on students’ cognitive skills and educational 
performance in secondary education (Causa & Johansson 2009, OECD 2010). On the other 
hand, high expenditure on tertiary education may actually reinforce the importance of family 
background (Behrman et al. 1998). Behrman et al. (2001) emphasise that a significant 
proportion of educational spending should be targeted towards the students with the lowest 
prospects for completing schooling. Since students from relatively privileged backgrounds tend 
to be overrepresented in higher education, resources are not directed where they could be the 
most efficient in generating mobility (Corak 2013). 
 
6.2.2 The Quality of Education and the Social Mix in Schools 
As noted in figure 8, numerous countries seem to have a high spending on education without 
generating more mobility. As mentioned above, this may lie in where educational spending is 
targeted. The quality of education has been stressed to be just as important as the quantity of 
education (see OECD 2010, Daude 2011) and even though educational coverage has been 
expanded across the region (Azevedo & Bouillon 2009), there are still large differences in the 
educational quality between private and public schools (Daude 2011). Notably, the low quality 
in public education and the opportunity cost for completing secondary school, results in high 
dropout rates (Azevedo & Bouillon 2009). According to Andersen (2000) one way of reducing 
schooling gaps is to ensure that the benefits of schooling are sufficiently high. This could be 
done by improving the classroom environment as well as the quality of teachers. Furthermore, 
there is a large disparity between which groups in society that receive public versus private 
schooling. The most privileged students attend private schools and the students from the middle 
class or the poor social strata, go to public schools (Daude 2011). The lack of diversity and 
mixing of students from different socioeconomic backgrounds hinders mobility. According to 
Daude (2011), limiting schools from picking students from similar backgrounds would promote 
greater diversity. Evidence from the OECD countries, suggests that a higher social mix of 
students increases performance without lowering overall achievement (see Causa & Johansson 
2009, OECD 2010). 
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6.2.3 Returns to Education 
According to findings by Daude (2011), there is a positive correlation between returns to 
education and the level of immobility. In the Latin American region, returns to education are 
above the average rates for the OECD countries. As described in our theoretical framework, 
Solon (2004) shows that the parents’ investment in human capital depends upon, among other 
things, the returns to human capital. This implies that the higher the returns to education, the 
more incentives there are for richer families to invest in their children’s human capital. Since 
returns to education are particularly high in Latin America, this enlarges the gap between the 
different socioeconomic groups and thus, consolidate the persistence of intergenerational 
immobility. 
 
6.3 Credit Constraints and the Transition into Higher Education 
Recalling our theoretical framework from section 3, parents’ investments in children depend 
upon the trade-off between investment and consumption (Solon 2004). Thus, poor households 
have less possibility to invest in their children compared to rich parents, who have already 
satisfied their basic needs through consumption. Furthermore, poor parents cannot borrow 
against their offspring’s income, in order to finance human capital accumulation (Aiyagari, 
Greenwood & Seshadri 2002). Consequently, access to credit markets is a key determinant of 
intergenerational mobility, as it ensures that opportunities can be ceased regardless of parental 
background (Daude 2011). A key area for public policy is therefore to remove the constraints 
holding families back from pursuing further study (Behrman et al. 2001). 
 
Figure 9 - Loan in the Past Year and the Estimated Beta-Coefficient on Parents’ Education 
 
Source: World Bank Indicators 2011 and the authors’ own calculations 
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Figure 9 plots our beta-coefficient against the percentage of individuals over 15 years old, who 
had taken a loan in the past year for our sample countries. This is used as an indicator of access 
to credit, however it is not unproblematic, since it does not measure the accessibility of credit 
in itself. Nevertheless, as a rough approximation, we note a weak negative relationship between 
our measure of intergenerational mobility and our indicator of credit access. In our sample’s 
most immobile country, El Salvador, individuals seem to have taken almost no loans. By 
contrast, relatively mobile countries such as Colombia and Mexico, exhibit higher degrees of 
borrowing. Venezuela is an exception, which exhibits higher levels of mobility than expected 
given the propensity to borrow. Thus, we observe that individuals tend to borrow more in 
countries with higher mobility, although no conclusion around the nature of borrowing can be 
established. 
 
Against this background, access to credit may play an important role in generating 
intergenerational mobility, if used for human capital accumulation. In high-income countries, 
government-supported loan systems for tertiary education are shown to decrease obstacles for 
students from disadvantaged backgrounds (Causa & Johansson 2009, OECD 2010). For 
example, Oliveira Martins, Boarini, Strauss, de la Maisonneuve & Saadi (2007) find that lower 
financial constraints are associated with higher graduation rates in tertiary education. However, 
lack of credit is not the main hindrance for moving from secondary to tertiary education, since 
not all of the students from lower socioeconomic background have sufficient qualifications to 
enter a higher education (Carneiro & Heckman 2003). Thus, the most able students are also 
more likely to be financially constrained in acquiring higher education. Once more, the main 
problem lies within the fact that the average quality of the education is lower in public schools, 
and leaves students without the necessary abilities to enter higher education.  
 
Although the main priority for Latin America should be to ease the transition from primary to 
secondary education, access to credit is a necessity in order to increase the presence of students 
from disadvantaged backgrounds in tertiary education. Evidence from Denmark, Finland, Italy 
and Luxemburg shows that a son whose father has undergone higher education is 30 percentage 
points more likely to complete higher education, compared to someone whose father had only 
completed upper secondary education (OECD 2010). As our estimates from table 7 suggest, 
there is a similar, if not worse, effect in Latin America. Thus, in addition to equipping students 
with necessary skills for entering university, student loans and grants could serve as a facilitator 
for wider accessibility of higher education (Daude 2011). 
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6.4 Illustrative Case Study: The Brazilian CCT Programme Bolsa Família 
The objective of this case study is to provide an example of a social policy that addresses the 
different causes of intergenerational immobility discussed in this section. Conditional cash 
transfer (CCT) programmes aim to reduce the cost of education by providing transfers to poor 
families, conditional on having their children enrolled in school. These programmes have 
become a central component of social policy in Latin America, e.g. Mexico’s Oportunidades, 
Familias en Acción in Colombia and the Bolsa Família in Brazil (Soares, Ribas & Osório 2010). 
Here, we take a closer look at the potential implications of Bolsa Família in the light of our 
previous findings. Bolsa Família is a CCT programme introduced in 2003, which provides 
monthly transfers to poor families with incomes under R$ 140 (US$ 59). Families receive R$ 
32 (or US$ 14) per month, for a maximum of five children under 15 years old. For a maximum 
of two adolescents between 16 and 17 years old, the family receives R$38 (US$16) per month 
(Bohn, Veiga, Dalt, Brandão & Gouvêa 2014). Benefits are also given to breastfeeding/pregnant 
women and all payments are given out directly to the woman’s bank card, on the basis that 
women are shown to invest more in their family (Glewwe & Kassouf 2012). In order to receive 
benefits, children under 6 years old must be immunized, the woman must provide proof of 
having undergone prenatal and postnatal medical care and children must attend school at least 
85% of the time (Bohn et al. 2014). 
 
Recalling our previous estimates, the beta- and the correlation coefficient for Brazil suggested 
a high persistence in parental education on that of the offspring. However, these levels were 
intermediate in relation to the other Latin American countries (see figures 3 and 4). 
Nevertheless, the combined level of inequality and immobility was among the highest in our 
sample (see figure 6). Ethnicity displayed a significant effect on educational attainment, while 
the interaction term between parental education and the dummy variable for white was 
insignificant. Whereas non-whites have less education than whites, no conclusion regarding the 
effect of ethnicity on social mobility could be reached based on our estimates. However, Ribeiro 
(2010) show that in Brazil, social class has a stronger influence at lower educational levels, 
while ethnicity starts having a real impact at higher levels. Drawing on historical evidence, 
Marió & Woolcock, with von Bulow (2008) suggest that non-whites face more difficulties in 
converting their human capital into monetary returns. 
 
As described in our theoretical framework, parents’ investment choice in human capital are 
important for generating social mobility. A very unique feature of Bolsa Família is its focus on 
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the accumulation of human capital by education and health (Handa & Davis 2006), as well as 
targeting of children up to 17 years old. Solon (2004), pointed out that expenditure on early 
education promotes mobility, since benefits reach the worst off, rather than those from more 
privileged backgrounds who tend to be overrepresented in tertiary education. Glewwe & 
Kassouf (2012) estimated Bolsa Família to have risen enrolment rates with about 5.5%-6.5% 
in grades 1-8, with a stronger impact on girls and non-whites. 
 
Another important aspect is the increased opportunity cost for undertaking other activities than 
schooling, which decreases the likelihood of students dropping out of school. Evidence has 
shown an overall decrease in dropout rates for children participating in Bolsa Família (Oliveira, 
Andrade, Resende, Rodrigues, Rodrigues & Ribas 2007, Glewwe & Kassouf 2012). For 
example, in grades 1-8, dropout rates decreased by 0.4-0.5 percentage points, particularly 
among the non-white students (Glewwe & Kassouf 2012). Decreasing dropout rates is essential 
in order to ensure transition from one educational level to another, which enables children to 
reach an education beyond that of their parents. 
 
CCT programmes may also have implications beyond raising the average education of the poor. 
For example, Soares, Soares, Medeiros & Osório (2006) estimated Bolsa Família to explain 
21% of the fall in the Gini index in 1995-2004. Another important aspect is that the 
supplementary funds reduce the necessity for constrained families to sacrifice consumption for 
human capital investment. One potential obstacle for the success of Bolsa Família, is that 
schools with a high amount of children participating in the programme, also tend to have less 
resources, e.g. fewer computers and well-educated teachers (Glewwe & Kassouf 2012). The 
high concentration of students from poorer backgrounds in the same school may actually reduce 
some of the programme’s efficiency. Daude (2011) shows that Brazilian students in private 
schools outperform those in public schools with approximately 100 points in the 2006 PISA 
survey, meaning that a student from a private school has approximately three years more of 
education, measured in cognitive skills. Thus, the programme could be even more efficient if 
its students were more widely spread across the schools. Another frequently discussed 
disadvantage with CCT programmes is whether or not the benefits exceed the cost (see Handa 
& Davis 2006). Glewwe & Kassouf (2012) point out that the long-run effect of Bolsa Família 
may only prove profitable if successfully targeted to students who would otherwise not have 
attended school. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this thesis was to explore the extent of social mobility in Latin America, the most 
unequal region in the world. Using educational attainment as a proxy for socioeconomic status, 
we find that the average correlation between parental and child education is approximately 0.56 
for the whole Latin American region, which is higher than the global average correlation of 
0.43 estimated by Hertz et al. (2007). With regards to our beta-coefficient, its average level of 
0.40 suggests that Latin America is still highly immobile, although it is lower than previous 
estimates from Daude (2011) and Daude & Robano (2015). Countries with the highest level of 
immobility included El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Uruguay, whereas countries with relatively 
higher mobility included Colombia, Mexico and Costa Rica. Paraguay was an outlier 
throughout all estimations.  
 
With regards to our second research question, we find with statistical significance that females 
and non-whites face lower mobility than whites and males respectively. As expected, being 
female slightly decreases intergenerational mobility, as the beta-coefficient increases with 
approximately 0.02. On the other hand, being white slightly increases mobility as the beta-
coefficient decreases with approximately -0.0320. Previous literature had been inconclusive in 
this regard. While the coefficients are small, it provides an indication that could be further 
explored. Here, looking into differences in mobility attributed to gender and ethnicity using 
both education, occupation and income could provide a more comprehensive overview of the 
situation. As was mentioned in the literature, non-whites face lower returns to education than 
whites, which could imply that while differences in educational mobility may be smaller, 
mobility in terms of earnings and occupation are likely to be larger.   
 
Throughout our study, the majority of estimates were consistent whether education was 
measured as the number of years or the educational level.  Furthermore, we explored the 
transition from secondary to tertiary education more closely, something which has attracted 
more attention for industrialised countries. We find a high probability that the respondent will 
attend university, given that the parents have higher education, compared to individuals whose 
parents have not attended university. This effect is stronger for our sample countries, than for 
the developed countries. 
                                                          
20 Measured by educational years as an indicator. When using the level of education as our indicator, the 
significance of  𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑐 × 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑐 disappears but the effect is larger and still points in the same direction. 
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In an attempt to evaluate the potential drivers of intergenerational mobility and the implications 
for public policy, we discussed our results in the light of previous research. However, further 
research on this area is encouraged, in order to establish causal relationships between 
intergenerational mobility and its determinants. Intergenerational mobility seems to be 
associated with income inequality to a certain extent, however, the distribution of education 
itself shows a clearer relationship. To improve mobility across the generations, educational 
policies should seemingly seek to improve the quality of education, notably in the public 
system. Since most of the disadvantaged students are gathered in the public schools this would 
equalise the opportunities to undertake higher studies. Good examples of policies that target the 
most disadvantaged are the conditional cash transfer programmes, such as Bolsa Família in 
Brazil. However, in order to prevent the cost of the programmes to exceed the benefits, it is 
important to improve efficiency, by reaching households where students would not have 
attended school in absence of the cash transfers. Furthermore, credit access and in particular, 
grants/student loans could ease the transition to tertiary education. 
 
To conclude, although social mobility seems somewhat improved in the region compared to 
previous studies, much is still left to be done at the governmental level. Expanding opportunities 
to the most disadvantaged groups, notably to non-whites and females, could break the inequality 
trap by which inequalities are reproduced across generations. This is essential in order to offer 
individuals the freedom to choose their own economic and social outcomes, regardless of 
birthplace. This would, in spite of high levels of economic inequality in the region, bridge the 
gap between different groups and create a more cohesive society. Only when social mobility is 
at the core of the political agenda, the transmission of inequality will be broken. 
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9. APPENDIX 
Figure 10 - Inequality in Income by Regions 
 
Source: Human Development Indices: A statistical update 2015, United Nations Development Programme21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 Available from: http://data.un.org/DocumentData.aspx?q=inequality+adjusted+hdi&amp;id=379 
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Table 10: Dependent Variables 
  
Dependent Variable Definition 
  
RE: Respondent Education 
(Years of Education) 
The respondent's education measured as the number of schooling 
years. Each year takes a numeric value, where:  
 
1 denotes "without education", 14 denotes "incomplete university" 
and 15 "completed university" 
  
RE: Respondent Education 
(Level of Education) 
 
The respondent's education measured as the highest level attained 
from 1-7, where: 
1 denotes "illiterate", 
 
 
 
 
2 "primary incomplete", 
3 "primary complete", 
4 "secondary/vocational/intermediate incomplete", 
5 "secondary/vocational/intermediate complete", 
 
6 "higher incomplete" and 
7 "higher complete" 
  
RU: Parent University 
(Years of Education) 
Dummy variable. 1 if the respondent has either incomplete or 
complete university education, denoted as 14 or 15 
 
0 if the respondent has no university education, taking all values 
under 14 
  
RU: Parent University 
(Level of Education) 
Dummy variable. 1 if the respondent has either incomplete or 
complete university education, denoted as 5 or 7 
 
0 if the respondent has no university education, taking all values 
under 5 
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Table 11: Independent Variables 
  
Independent Variable  Definition 
  
PE: Parent Education 
(Years of education)  
The parents' education measured as the number of schooling years, 
reported by the respondent. Each year takes a numeric value 
 
from 1-15, where: 
1 denotes "without education", 14 denotes  
"incomplete university" and 15 "completed university" 
  
PE: Parent Education 
(Level of education)  
 
 
The parents' education measured as the highest level attained, from 1-7, 
where: 
1 denotes "illiterate", 
2 "primary incomplete", 
 
3 "primary complete", 
4 "secondary/vocational/intermediate incomplete", 
5 "secondary/vocational/intermediate complete" 
 
6 "higher incomplete" and 
7 "higher complete" 
  
PU: Parent University 
(Years of education) 
Dummy variable. 1 if the parents’ have either incomplete or complete 
university education, corresponding to the values 14 or 15. 
 0 if the parents have no university education, taking all values under 14. 
  
PU: Parent University 
(Level of education) 
Dummy variable. 1 if the parents’ have either incomplete or complete 
university education, corresponding to the values 6 or 7. 
 
0 if the parents' have no university education, corresponding to all values 
under 6. 
  
Age Years, from 18-99 
  
Age squared The number of years squared 
  
Small City 
 
Dummy variable. 1: If the respondent lives in a city with 20 000 
inhabitants or less. 0 If the respondent lives in a city with more 
 than 20 000 inhabitants. 
  
Female 
 
Dummy variable. 1: If the respondent is female. 0 If the respondent is 
male 
  
White 
 
Dummy variable. 1 If the respondent is white. 0 if the respondent is 
black, indigenous, mestizo or mulatto. 
  
Married 
 
Dummy variable. 1 if the respondent is married. 0 if the respondent is 
single or divorced 
  
θ 
 
Country-fixed effects, controlling for disparities in average achievement 
in education across countries 
 
 
 
